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INTRODUCTION
This address was delivered by Dr. Hannah Arendt at the Convocation of
the Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration of Connecticut College at New London,
Connecticut, September 21, 1961, under the sponsorship of the College and of
the Henry Wells Lawrence and the Frederick Henry Sykes Memorial Lecture
ships. It is here published as the eighteenth Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial
Lecture.
The Lawrence Lectureship was established in memory of the distinguished
scholar who was Chairman of the Department of History and Government at
Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942. It was founded and endowed by his
former students, colleagues and friends in order "to bring to the campus
annually a scholar in the broad field of history who will present his subject
in the spirit of the liberal tradition to which Dr. Lawrence was devoted."
A list of previous Lawrence Lectures appears at the end of this publi
cation. Dr. Arendt's address extends the scope of these studies, as her
scholarly understanding and creative approach have frequently extended the
political wisdom of our time.
Dr. Rosemary Park, President of Connecticut College, said in introducing
Dr. Arendt, "She is known on both sides of the Atlantic for the breadth of
her historical perspective, her acute analysis, and the richness and the scope of
her ideas. As the author of The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human
Condition and, most recently, Between Past and Future, Dr. Arendt brings the
wealth of her European background to the intellectual service of this new
country."
Hannah Arendt was born in Hannover, Germany, and holds a doctorate
from the University of Heidelberg. She has been an American citizen since
1950, and has taught at the universities of California, Chicago, Columbia and
Princeton, and in 1961 was a fellow of the Center for Advanced Studies of
Wesleyan University. She has been research director of the Conference on
Jewish Relations, executive director of Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, New
York City, and was chief editor of Shocken Books, Inc.
"Revolution and Freedom" is part of a larger work in preparation by Dr.
Arendt, and may not be reproduced in whole or in part without the author's
permission. Certain passages from the address appeared in a symposium
entitled "The Cold War and the West" in Partisan Review Vol. XXIX, 1
(Winter, 1962).
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REVOLUTION AND FREEDOM, A Lecture
I
I feel honored and I am very grateful for the privilege of addressing you
on this happy occasion. I can only hope you will not take it amiss if I intro
duce into these festive proceedings a few reflections which may remind us of
the troubled and perplexed state in which the public affairs of our country,
and indeed of the world at large, find themselves at the present moment. My
justification lies in the title I have given these reflections. For the words
Revolution and Freedom seem to me to sum up about all we can see of an
uncertain and flickering ray of hope in the otherwise rather dark and threaten
ing prospects of the future.
Before we turn our attention to the uncertainties of hope, permit me to
dwell for a few moments on the prospects of legitimate fear without for
getting, however, that these are by no means less uncertain. Immediately upon
the close of the Second World War there has followed a period which we
chose to call the time of "cold war," a term that I think was a misnomer.
The fifteen years behind us were a time of uneasy "cold peace" in which the
two great world powers have tried, more or less successfully, to define their
spheres of interest and to jockey for position in the rapidly changing power
structure of a world in turmoil. However, the very fact that we have been
calling "cold war" what actually was "cold peace" testifies to our main pre
occupation with the fear of war. That we have been far more preoccupied with
this fear than with any other issue has been manifest in each of the major
crises during this period—the Korean War, the Suez adventure, the Hungarian
and the Cuban revolutions; in each of these instances, our conduct was
primarily determined by fear of a major war that would be a war with nuclear
weapons.
The recent and, let us hope, temporary resumption of atomic tests, on the
other hand, may give us an indication of what a cold war actually may turn
out to be. For these tests, unlike those that preceded them, have the ominous
aspect of a new kind of maneuver in time of peace, involving in their
exercise not the make-believe pair of enemies of ordinary troop maneuvers
but the pair who, potentially at least, are the real enemies. The nuclear
armament race has turned into some sort of tentative, hypothetical warfare in
which the opponents demonstrate to each other the destructiveness of the
weapons in their possession; and while it is always possible that this deadly
game of ifs and whens may suddenly turn into the real thing, it is by no means
4

inconceivable that one day victory and defeat may end a war that never
exploded into reality. Potentially, we were confronted with hypotheical war
fare even at the end of the Second World War when many people thought it
would have been much wiser, and not only more humane, to demonstrate the
new atomic bomb to the Japanese on a deserted island instead of actually
dropping it on Hiroshima; the demonstration itself would have forced the
enemy into unconditional surrender. Obviously, this play with hypotheses pre
supposes a stage of technical development in which nearly all risks can be
calculated so that there is hardly any room left for chance. It also presupposes
an equality in knowledge and know-how among those who play the game.
Thus a chess game between two equally experienced players will end with one
of them conceding defeat or with both of them agreeing on a stalemate long
before all the moves leading up to checkmate or stalemate have actually been
made. I use this old comparison of war and chess not because I believe that it
has been true in the past, but because it looks as though we were moving into
a direction of mastery of the technical means of violence in which the old simile
might unexpectedly acquire its measure of truth.
Cold war, then, is actually hypothetical war, and hypothetical war, like
cold peace, is determined by our justified fear of real war. It sometimes looks
as though our only hope lies in the substitution of hypothetical warfare for
real war—at least until we arrive at a state of international affairs which rules
out the use of the means of violence as a last resort of all policy. To be sure,
such a development still lies in a distant future; there exists, however, even
now an indication that we may indeed be on our way to it. The indication
lies in the rather obvious, though frequently neglected, fact that war can no
longer be justified on rational grounds or on the basis of power politics. Of
course, this does not preclude the outbreak of war, but it rules out most, if not
all, of its time-honored justifications. Neither the ancient wisdom of "better
death than slavery" nor the nineteenth century definition of war as the "con
tinuation of politics with other means" can possibly apply to the kind of whole
sale destruction with which we may be confronted. The former, moreover, has
its origin in the situation of prisoners in ancient warfare when the victor used
to carry home the defeated enemy and sell him into slavery. "Better death than
slavery" was meant as an individual decision, although it could involve a
whole community if all the citizens individually agreed that they preferred to
risk extermination rather than dispersion into servitude. This decision, how
ever, was based on the ancient conviction that to become a slave meant to
cease to be human. To be free and to be human once were identical notions;
a person who was unable to exercise all his faculties, mental as well as physical,
was no longer considered a man, and this regardless of whether some kind of
necessity, such as poverty and disease, or some man-made violence, such as war
and slavery, had deprived him of them.
5

Do those who today repeat the ancient formula still believe in this coinci
dence of freedom and humanity? Do people when they hear the slogan "better
dead than red really think of freedom? Don't they rather have in mind a way
of life and a standard of living that are the result of abundance and can be
enjoyed even in a state of deprivation of freedom? Finally, is it not obvious
that it is a very different thing to risk one's own life for the life and freedom
of ones country and one's posterity than to risk the very existence of the
human species for the same purpose? Even less applicable to our present
circumstance is Clausewitz's famous definition of war, because it proceeds
from the actualities of war in the nineteenth century and hence does not take
into account the possibility of complete annihilation. War is the continuation
of politics with other means only in the kind of limited armed contests, con
ducted according to rules of the game, that we have known during a relatively
brief period of our history. Perhaps this limited warfare can still survive in
conflicts between small nations, although I doubt even this. It certainly is
inconceivable in a war between the big powers.
this as in other modern perplexities of a political nature, it seems we
are not too well equipped to deal in terms of new thought with troubles that
quan itatively as well as qualitatively are entirely new. Those who are ready
o accept nuc ear warfare as a last, albeit desperate, resort pretend that essenhally nothing has changed, that the old justifications still hold, and they try
to reassure themselves with the hope that "the losses may not be as great as
some anticipate Yet while we may be rightly alarmed at this optimism which
p o a y is not ing ut lack of imagination — the inability to at least face the
inconceivable - the truth is that those who oppose nuclear warfare on principle
have come up with nothing better for their justification than a reversal of the
o d wisdom when they tell us: better red than dead. Hence the whole discussion
of the war question, moving within the closed circle of an obsolete alternative,
is nearly always conducted with a mental reservation on both sides of the
fence. Those who say: better dead than red, actually think: the losses will
d
°UruC1V,lll2atlon wil1 survive; while those who say: better red
n dead, actually think: slavery will not be so bad, man will not change
his nature, freedom will not vanish from the earth forever.
than
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time had somehow disappeared from political discussions in favor of the
notion that the end of government is not freedom but the welfare of the
people, the happiness of the greatest number, has now returned, though in a
somewhat oblique fashion, into the center of statecraft. And freedom is not
only one among the many phenomena of the political realm, such as justice, or
power, or equality; freedom, though it can be the direct aim of political action
only in times of crisis, of war or revolution, is actually the reason that men
live together in political organization at all. The raison d'etre of politics is
freedom, and without it, political life would be meaningless.
This intrusion of the notion of freedom into discussions of war and of
a justifiable use of the means of violence is of relatively recent date. To be
sure, justifications of war, even on a theoretical level, are quite old, although,
of course, not as old as organized warfare. An obvious prerequisite for such
justifications is the conviction that political relations in their normal course do
not fall under the sway of violence, and this conviction we find for the first
time in Greek antiquity, insofar as the Greek polis, the constitution of the
city-state, defined itself explicitly as a way of life that was based exclusively
upon persuasion and not upon violence. That these were no empty words,
spoken in self-deception, is shown by the Athenian custom of "persuading"
those who had been condemned to death to commit suicide by drinking the
hemlock cup, thus sparing the Athenian citizen under all circumstances the
indignity of physical violation. However, since for the Greeks political life by
definition did not extend beyond the walls of the polis, the use of violence
seemed to them beyond the need for justification in the realm of what we to
day call foreign affairs or international relations, even though their foreign
affairs, with the one exception of the Persian wars which saw all Hellas united,
concerned hardly more than relations between Greek cities. Outside the walls
of the polis, that is, outside the realm of politics in the Greek sense of the
word, "the strong did what they could, and the weak suffered what they
must," as Thucydides tells us. What caused the early downfall of Greece was
precisely that their polis-otg3.nxza.tion did not find a way to introduce the non
violent means of politics into the relationships between the poleis, between
the city-states.
Within the historical framework of Western civilization, we find the first
justifications of war, together with the first notion that there are just and un
just wars, in Roman antiquity. Yet curiously enough, these distinctions and
justifications are not concerned with freedom and draw no line between
aggressive and defensive warfare. "Just is a war," said Livy, "to whom it is
necessary, and hallowed are the arms where no hope exists but in them"
(7usturn enirn est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma ubi nulla nisi in
armis spes est.) Necessity, since the time of Livy and through the centuries,
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has meant many things that we today would find quite sufficient to dub a
war unjust rather than just. Expansion, conquest, defense of vested interests,
conservation of power in view of the rise of new and threatening powers, and
support of a given power equilibrium—all these well-known realities of power
politics have perhaps only the remotest connection with a nation's freedom;
and yet they were not only actually the causes for the outbreaks of most wars
in history, they were also recognized as "necessities," that is, as legitimate
motives to invoke a decision of arms. The notion that aggression is a crime and
that wars can be justified only if they ward off aggression or prevent it, has
acquired its practical and even theoretical significance only after the First
World War had demonstrated the horribly destructive potential of warfare
under conditions of modern technology.
There is, however, another aspect of the war question in which freedom
indeed plays the decisive part. From time immemorial, people have risen
against the foreign invader, and while these warlike uprisings were never
recognized, either in theory or in practice, as the only just wars, they always
ave been felt to be sacred. If war in our century is at all a justifiable act,
then the only precedent to which its defenders might appeal would be such
wars of rebellion and liberation. And this is not only a theoretical issue but
a matter of recent recorded fact. The Second World War was in all its more
important aspects no longer due to power politics in the old sense of the term.
You may remember that it was considered by a sizable portion of public
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consolation may well be that at least it has always been freedom which, in one
way or another, sincerely or hypocritically, was at stake. Even the tyrants today
are forced to speak of freedom.
We may pursue these reflections a few steps further. The interrelatedness
of wars and revolutions is not a novel phenomenon; it is indeed as old as the
revolutions themselves, which either were preceded and accompanied by a war
of liberation like the American Revolution or which led into wars of defense
and aggression like the French Revolution. Yet in these eighteenth-century in
stances, it was the revolutions that touched off the wars, whereas in our own
century it has frequently been the other way round. It has been little noticed
but is quite noteworthy that since the end of the First World War, we almost
automatically expect no government, and no state or form of government, to
be strong enough to survive a defeat in war. (This is not entirely unprece
dented; both the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the Russo-Japanese War
of 1905 were followed by short-lived revolts in the defeated countries. But
though in France there was even a change of form of government —
from the Second Empire to the Third Republic — still, these were mere
premonitions.) A revolutionary change in government, either brought about
by the people themselves, as after World War I, or enforced from the outside
by the victorious powers with the demand of unconditional surrender and the
establishment of War Trials, belongs today among the most certain con
sequences of defeat — short, of course, of total annihilation. Whether this
state of affairs is due to a decisive weakening of government as such, to a loss
of authority in the powers that be, or whether no state, no matter how well
established and trusted by its citizens, could withstand the unparalleled terror
of violence unleashed by modem warfare upon the whole population, is an
open question that we shall not try to decide here. In our context, it must be
enough to remember the indisputable fact that even prior to the horror of
nuclear warfare, wars had become politically, though not yet biologically, a
matter of life and death. Or, to put it another way: under conditions of
modern warfare, that is, since the First World War, all governments have
lived on borrowed time.
The close interrelatedness of war and revolution could be spun out
further. Here these brief remarks are meant to suggest that our present topic,
revolution and freedom, may somehow be connected with the as yet unanswer
able war question, although it would be folly to expect an answer to the latter
from a consideration of the former. We have come to a point of technical de
velopment where it really looks as though the only choice left to men with re
spect to war is to abolish it before wars abolish mankind, as Mr. Kennedy
recently put it. Except that it is by no means sure that this will be the last word
in the matter. It is quite conceivable that the next stage of technical advance
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may bring us back to a kind of warfare which, though probably more horrible
than the last wars, will not be suicidal and, perhaps, will not even spell com
plete biological annihilation to the defeated. What is inconceivable, however, is
that war will ever again become the benign and limited armed contest whose
outcome is not revolutionary because it leaves intact the political, though not
the territorial, integrity of the defeated.
In other words, whatever the outcome of our present predicament may be,
if we don't perish altogether (which I somehow think is unlikely despite all
t e evidence to the contrary), the problem of revolution is likely to stay with us
at least into the foreseeable future. Even if we should succeed in changing the
p ysiognomy of this century to the point where it would no longer be a
century of wars it most certainly will remain a century of revolutions. And
since revolution has now spread to the four corners of the earth, any peaceful,
non-violent contest between the great powers may well be decided by the
simple question of which one understands better what is involved and what is
at stake in a revolution.
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find the word as a political term already in the seventeenth century; but it was
then used in its strict metaphorical sense to describe a movement of revolving
back to some pre-established point, and hence, politically, to indicate a motion
of swinging back into some pre-ordained order. Thus, the word was first used
not when what we call a revolution broke out in England and Cromwell rose
to a kind of revolutionary dictatorship, but on the contrary, in 1660, after the
overthrow of the Rump Parliament and at the occasion of the restoration of
the monarchy. And even the Glorious Revolution, the event through which,
rather paradoxically, the term found its definite place in political and historical
language, was not thought of as a revolution at all, but as the restoration of
monarchical power to its former righteousness and glory.
The fact that the word revolution meant originally restoration is more
than a mere oddity of semantics. You do not understand revolution unless you
realize that the first revolutions broke out when restorations had been aimed at.
We are liable to overlook this paradoxical fact because nothing in the course
of the two great eighteenth century revolutions is more conspicuous and more
striking than the emphatic stress on novelty, repeated over and over again by
actors and spectators alike
their insistence that nothing comparable in
significance and grandeur had ever happened before, that an entirely new
story was about to unfold. Yet this entirely new story was initiated, on both
sides of the Atlantic, by men who were firmly convinced that they were about
to do no more than restore an old order of things that had been disturbed
and violated by the existing powers: they pleaded in all sincerity that they
desired to revolve back to old times when things had been as they ought to be.
Nothing would have been more alien to their mind than eagerness for new
things or the present-day conviction that novelty as such could be desirable.
The enormous pathos of a new era, of the novus ordo saeclorum, which is still
inscribed on our dollar bills, came to the fore only after the actors, much
against their will, had come to a point of no return.
Before we try to ascertain the significance of this strange semantic change,
and before we probe deeper into the causes that brought it about, we must turn
our attention briefly to another aspect of revolution, which still corresponds
to its old astronomical meaning and has not been discarded by modern usage,
presumably because the experiences during the actual course of revolutions did
not contradict it. As I already indicated, the astronomical term as well as its
original metaphorical meaning implied very strongly the notion of irre
sistibility — the fact that the revolving motion of the stars follows a pre
ordained path and is removed from all influence of human power. We know, or
we believe we know, the exact date when the word 'revolution' was used for'the
first time with an exclusive emphasis on irresistibility and without any connota
tion of a backward revolving movement; and so important has this emphasis
11

appeared to the historian's understanding of revolutions, that it has become
common practice to date the new political significance of the astronomical term
from this moment.
The date was the night of the 14th of July, 1789, in Paris, when Louis
XVI heard from the Comte de Liancourt of the fall of the Bastille, the
liberation of a few prisoners, and the defection of the royal troops before the
massed populace. The famous dialogue that took place between the king and
his messenger is very short and very revealing. The king, we are told, ex
claimed: "C'est une revolte," and Liancourt corrected him: "Non, Sire, c'est
une revolution!" Here we hear the word still, and politically for the last time,
in the sense of the old metaphor which carries its meaning from the skies
down to the earth; but here, for the first time, the emphasis has shifted from
the lawfulness of a rotating, cyclical movement to its irresistibility. The motion
is still seen in the image of the movements of the stars, but what is stressed
now is that it is beyond human power to arrest it, that it is a law unto itself.
The king, when he declared that the storm of the Bastille was a rebellion,
asserted his power and the various means at his disposal to deal with con
spiracy and defiance of authority; Liancourt replied that what had happened
there was irrevocable and beyond the power of kings. It was irresistible.
This, as we know, the storming of the Bastille, was only the beginning.
The notion of an irresistible movement, which the nineteenth century soon
was to conceptualize into the idea of historical necessity, echoes from beginning
to end through the pages of the French Revolution. Suddenly an entirely new
imagery begins to cluster around the old metaphor, and when we think
of revolution, we almost automatically begin to think in terms of this imagery
born in the days of the French Revolution -— in the days when Desmoulins
saw the great revolutionary torrent" on whose rushing waves the actors were
borne and carried away until its undertow sucked them from the surface and
they perished together with their foes, the agents of counter-revolution; when
Robespierre could speak of the tempest and mighty current which, nourished
by the crimes of tyranny on one side, by the progress of liberty on the other,
increased constantly in rapidity and violence; when even the spectators
believed they were watching a "majestic lava stream which spares nothing and
which nobody can arrest, a spectacle that had fallen under the sign of Saturn:
' the revolution devouring its own children."
The words I am reading to you here are not taken from later historical
or reflective accounts of what was happening during those fateful years. They
were all spoken by the actors themselves and they testify to things heard and
seen and witnessed by them, not to things they had done or set out to do on
purpose. To be sure, these phrases have by now degenerated into the clicheridden stock-in-trade of revolutionary oratory with a demagogic flavor; but
12

even in their degenerated state they point to something real, to something that
had never happened before the French Revolution but has happened since at
regular intervals, first only in Europe and now in nearly all parts of the earth.
Hence it may well be worth our while to ask ourselves what it was that Liancourt was the first to catch a glimpse of? What it was that the actors and
witnesses of revolution saw and heard, and that they thought was irresistible
and irrevocable?
The answer, to begin with, seems simple. Behind these words, and ex
pressed in an entirely new imagery, we still can see and hear the multitude on
their march, how they burst onto the streets of Paris, which then still was not
merely the capital of France but the capital of the entire civilized world. And
this multitude, appearing for the first time in broad daylight, was actually the
multitude of the poor and the downtrodden, whom every century before had
hidden in darkness and shame. What from then on has been irrevocable, and
what the agents and spectators of revolution immediately recognized as such,
was that the public realm -— reserved, as far as memory could reach, to those
who were free, namely carefree of all the worries that are connected with life s
necessity, with bodily needs — should from now on offer its space and its
light to this immense majority who are not free because they are driven by
daily needs. Mankind had always known that there existed two aspects of
freedom, one negative, namely, to be free from constraint through others, the
other positive, namely to be free in action, to actualize not so much the I-will
as the I-can. What also always had been more or less understood was that
these two were interconnected, that no one could be free to do who was not
free from constraint. Hence to the men of the revolution who were still in full
possession of the ancient wisdom, the road to freedom seemed to be divided into
two stages, the negative stage of liberation from constraint (or tyranny, or
whatever the word might have been), which then was to be followed by the
positive stage of establishing freedom, or rather of building a space where
freedom could appear in the words and deeds of free men. The first stage was
characterized by violence; the violence of liberation had to be pitted against
the violence of tyranny, the violation of human rights and potentialities. But
the second stage was supposed to be free of violence. The establishment of a
new government, even when it turned out that the recovery of ancient privileges
could be secured only by transforming them into constitutional liberties and
hence was bound to begin an entirely new story, seemed to be a matter of
deliberation, of application of wisdom and prudence, rather than of violence.
However, this relatively simple scheme of revolutionary events — which
in rough outline corresponds to the course of the American Revolution — was
found to be entirely inapplicable the moment the French Revolution appeared
on the scene of history. It had left out of account the existence of those who
13

never had been admitted to the public realm, whom antiquity had held in
slavery, whom we find in a state of serfdom throughout the Middle Ages, and
whom even the first centuries of the modern age had granted no more than the
very precarious status of the "laboring poor." Hence freedom, it turned out
now, had always been a privilege, the privilege of the few, and this not only
in the positive sense that only the few were admitted to the public realm and
the rights of citizenship, but in its negative aspect as well. Only the few were
free to be free. For
and this is decisive — the negative sense of liberty was
now seen as consisting of considerably more than of being free from constraint
by others; it was not only, to use our present terminology, freedom from fear
that was involved but most emphatically and even primarily freedom from
want.
Freedom from fear is a privilege that even the few have enjoyed only in
relatively short periods of history, but freedom from want has indeed been the
great privilege by which an infinitely small percentage of men has been dis
tinguished throughout the centuries. Perhaps, one is tempted to add, only those
who know freedom from want are in a position to appreciate fully what it
means to be also free from fear. What has seemed irrevocable then, ever since
the French Revolution, was that those who were devoted to freedom could
never again be reconciled to a state of affairs where freedom from want was
a privilege of the few. Men who had started out to retrieve their own ancient
privileges and liberties saw themselves all of a sudden confronted with the
enormous task of liberating the people at large, who had never possessed them.
In other words, in principle at least, freedom has been identified with com
plete equa ity ever since the revolutions of the eighteenth century; and although
it is true that the political theory and practice of antiquity were very well aware
o the fact that no one can be free who does not move among his equals, it
is no less true that never before had this desire for equality comprehended the
whole population of any country. This was the first, and perhaps still is the
greatest and most far-reaching consequence of revolution. This is what Robes
pierre meant when he said the revolution had pitted the grandeur of man
against the pettiness of the great, or what Hamilton had in mind when he
spoke of the American Revolution having vindicated the honor of the human
race or what Kant finally, taught by Rousseau and the French Revolution, con
ceived of as the new dignity of man."
However, a, I mentioned before, the actors and spectators of the French
Revolution were not only, and perhaps not even primarily, impressed by the
Z2tf ,h
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that the revolutionary tempest, though unleashed bp men, could not be arrested
again by human power. That this was the impression of the kLg a"d his
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messenger may not be very surprising, for they certainly had played no role
in bringing forth these events. It is, of course, different with the men of the
revolution from whose immediate reactions with their telling imagery I quoted
just now. Obviously, they knew they had started something whose consequences
and inherent force they themselves had not foreseen and could not control;
their action, though aiming at liberty, had liberated something which in its
irresistibility they had not known and not seen before. It was only now, when
the people of Paris came streaming into the streets, that the very word 'le
peuple' acquired its revolutionary connotations and thus became the key term
of revolutions. What they, as opposed to the king and his messenger, saw as
being irresistible was the enormity as well as the pressing urgency of an 'unhappiness' that no one before had conceived of as a political factor of the first
magnitude.
To illustrate this relationship between the men of the revolution and the
multitudes in the street, let me quote Lord Acton's interpretative description
of the famous women's march to Versailles, one of the turning-points in the
French Revolution. The marchers "played the genuine part of mothers whose
children were starving in squalid homes, and they thereby afforded to motives
which they neither shared nor understood the aid of a diamond point that
nothing could withstand." The motives neither shared nor understood by the
multitude were those of the deputies as they originally arrived and assembled
in Paris to represent the "nation" rather than the "people"; what they were
concerned with — whether their name was Mirabeau or Robespierre, Danton
or Saint-Just — was government, the reformation of monarchy or, somewhat
later, the foundation of a republic. To put it another way, their original goal
was freedom, either in the form of retrieval of ancient liberties or in the
form of the Constitutio libertatis, the foundation and constitution of freedom.
Paris, however, to their surprise taught them a lesson about the conditions and
prerequisites of liberty which mankind has never forgotten since. The lesson,
despite its elementary simplicity, was new and unexpected. It said: "Si vous
voulez fonder une republique, vous devez vous occuper de tirer le peuple
d'un etat de misere qui les corrompt. On n'a point de vertues politiques sans
orgueil; on n'a point d'orgueil dans la detresse." (Saint-Just) Freedom, even
freedom from constraint, was but an empty word for those who were not
liberated from poverty; hence liberation, which must precede freedom, did not
merely mean liberation from a tyrannical king or a tyrannical form of govern
ment, but meant liberation from want. Once they had been forced to look, and
to look in public, upon the immense misery of those whom even Jefferson, this
great lover of the people, could call "la canaille of the big cities", it was
obvious that liberation had to mean first of all "dress and food and the
reproduction of the species," as the Sansculottes began to distinguish their own
rights from the lofty language of the proclamation of "the rights of man and
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of the citizen." Liberation meant provision with life's necessities, the abolition
of what then was called 'unhappiness,' in short, the solution of the social
question. Compared to the urgency of these demands, all deliberations about
the best form of government appeared irrelevant and futile. "La Republique?"
Robespierre was soon to exclaim, "La Monarchic? Je ne connais que la question
sociale." And Saint-Just, at the end of his short life — as though he had
forgotten all his earlier enthusiasm for "republican institutions" and public
freedom
concluded: The freedom of the people is in its private life. Let
government be only the force to protect this state of simplicity against force
itself."
Let me return for a moment to the term unhappiness," which, because of
the altogether different experiences of the American Revolution, does not carry
the same weight and the same connotations as the French words, le malheur, les
malheureux. The unhappy ones, les malheureux — this word became in the
course of the French Revolution what it never had been before; it became
synonymous with the word le peuple, the people. "Le peuple, les malheureux
m applaudissent"
this was almost idiomatic in revolutionary oratory. And
the point of the matter is that it was precisely this malheur, this misery and
unhappiness that were felt to be irresistible, "the diamond point that nothing
could withstand. What appeared here and was found to be irresistible was
necessity, the necessity to which all mortals are bound by virtue of being
subject to their bodies' daily needs and urges, hence a necessity which, prior to
t e modern age, had always been hidden, and protected against the public
realm and its freedom, within the relative security of the home and the private
lite of the family. Once this necessity appeared in public, embodied in the
sufferings of the immense majority of population, it was found that there was
no greater force on earth. Hence, in the words of the French Revolution, les
malheureux sont la puissance de la terre.
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deal politically with necessity was lost, and with it the original aim of revolu
tion, the establishment and constitution of freedom.
What the course of the French Revolution established once and for all
was that the conquest of poverty is a prerequisite for the foundation of free
dom; yet what we can also learn from the same revolution is that poverty
and necessity cannot be dealt with in the same way as violence, the violation of
rights and liberties. Obviously, the tragic mistake of the men of the French
Revolution was to pit violence against necessity; but they entered upon this
foredoomed path only after they had used and misused necessity, the mighty
force of want and misery and destitution, in their struggle against tyranny,
when they hoped to add to their own efforts that "diamond point" that would
make them irresistible. This "diamond point" then turned against them, until
they perished in the same fashion as the old regime whose downfall they had
been able to bring about. For, theoretically speaking, if violence pitted against
violence leads to war, civil or foreign, violence pitted against necessity has
always led to terror. Terror rather than mere violence, terror let loose after the
old regime has been defeated and the new regime established, is what sends
revolutions to their doom. The first indication of ruin comes when those newly
risen to power begin to forget that the sole aim and end of revolution is
freedom. Hence the beginning of the end of the French Revolution came when
all participants, moved by the misery of the people, suddenly agreed: Le but de
la Revolution est le Bonheur du Peuple.
I said that these facts and experiences have appeared in nearly every
revolution, and the great exception I had in mind was, of course, the American
Revolution. It may be an oversimplification to say that the American Revolution
succeeded where all other revolutions failed, but such historical oversimplifica
tions are justified and even needed when we try to understand in terms of
thought and remembrance. However, if we may say the American Revolution
succeeded because the men of the revolution became the Founding Fathers of
the American Republic, we must add at once that this success was due almost
entirely to the absence, on the American pre-revolutionary scene, of those
factors of poverty, misery, unhappiness, and hence of necessity which then were
present everywhere else, and which even today are still decisive factors in the
greater part of the world. I must refrain here from quoting the evidence, extant
in numerous travelers' reports from America throughout the eighteenth century
and even reaching deep into the seventeenth. We have, moreover, the horrorstruck accounts of American travelers to Europe, among them, as you know,
some of the Founding Fathers themselves, which give witness to a veritable
abyss separating social conditions in this country from those found abroad.
America had been a country of prosperity and abundance long before it became,
in the eyes of the world at large, the land of the free. And prosperity and
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abundance, which some of us today believe they owe to a system of free enter
prise and to the political institutions of liberty, were of course chiefly due to
entirely natural causes, to the immensity of the continent and the enormous
wealth of its resources.
Hence, when I said the American Revolution succeeded where all others
failed, I did not mean to say that it succeeded in solving the social question,
that is, that it found political ways and means to cure a country from the curse
of poverty. This is not to deny the enormous and enormously revolutionizing
influence of the New World s prosperity upon the events and the hopes in the
Old World. On the contrary, it is perfectly true that here, for the first time,
men began to see and to believe that misery and want do not have to be part
and parcel of the human condition on earth. John Adams said: "I always con
sider the settlement of America as the opening of a grand scheme and design
in Providence for the illumination of the ignorant and the emancipation of the
slavish part of mankind all over the earth." But he wrote these words ten years
before the outbreak of revolution, in a state of perfect unawareness of such a
possibility. In other words, the social question could not very well be solved by
revolution in America for the simple reason that at that moment no such
solution was required
if we leave out of account, as we must here, the
predicament of Negro slavery and the altogether different problem it posed.
Therefore, undisturbed by any outside factors the revolution could accomplish
its original aim: the establishment of institutions which guarantee liberty for
all, and the foundation of a new public realm, called a republic as opposed to
a monarchy, where everybody, in the words of Jefferson, could become a "par
ticipator in government."
Before I try to sum up and to draw a few conclusions, permit me to
indicate to you as briefly as I can a few of the things which were involved in
this constitutio libertatis, in the foundation of freedom. First of all, it was a
question of political freedom and not of civil rights and liberties that could
have been obtained through the establishment of a constitutional monarchy a possibility indeed that was reflected upon and then decided against precisely
because it would not have permitted the citizenry to participate in public busi
ness. For the absence of freedom under the rule of enlightened absolutism in
the eighteenth century did not consist so much in the denial of personal
liberties, certainly not for the members of the upper classes, as in the fact that,
in the words of Tocqueville, "the world of public affairs was not only hardly
known but was invisible" to anybody outside the king's entourage. What those
who made the revolution shared with the poor-quite apart from and also prior
to the role these poor were then to play - was obscurity, namely that the public
realm was invisible to them and that, by the same token, they lacked the public
space where they themselves could become visible and be of significance.
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Hence, love of freedom, for the men of the revolutions on both sides of the
Atlantic, comprehended those passions for distinction, emulation, significance,
and being seen in action (spectemur agendo} whose political, and not psycho
logical, significance John Adams discovered and analyzed in nearly all his
political writings. These passions -— which he then summed up in one sentence:
"It is in action and not in rest that we find our pleasure" — have been
among the decisive and, unfortunately, rather neglected motives in those who
became revolutionists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is indeed for
the sake of action and for the sake of thought that freedom as a political
reality is required. This political freedom must be distinguished from civil
rights and liberties that in all constitutional countries restrain the power of
government and protect the individual in his legitimate private and social
pursuits. Such rights and liberties are guaranteed by the body politic, but the
life and the activities they protect are not strictly political. Hence, seen from
the viewpoint of the political realm, they are negative freedoms, they spell out
the limitations not only of government but of the public realm as such. The
chief political freedoms, or the chief positive freedoms, are freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly. By freedom of speech I understand here not merely
the right to speak out freely in private without the government listening in on
what I say (which, as you know, is the rule now in all countries under com
munist domination); this right belongs among the negative freedoms of being
properly protected from public power. Freedom of speech means the right to
speak and to be heard in public, and so long as man's reason is not infallible,
this freedom will remain the prerequisite for freedom of thought. Freedom of
thought without freedom of speech is an illusion. Freedom of assembly,
furthermore, is the prerequisite for freedom of action insofar as no man can
act alone.
Before we entered into these considerations, I said that the conflict that
divides the world today — if it is not to be decided by the means of violence
and not to end in total annihilation — may well be determined by the extent
of our understanding of what is at stake in revolution. There are, to sum up,
chiefly two things involved: the liberation of the poor and of the oppressed,
that is, the solution of the social question and the abolition of colonialism, and
the foundation of freedom, the establishment of a new body politic. It seems
to me that we do not understand liberation very well, perhaps by virtue of our
own history, and that we are not very well equipped to deal with it; what we
lack is experience. I mentioned the absence of poverty from the American
scene prior to the Revolution, and I may add that the War of Independence
was not fought against a colonial power in the later imperialist sense of the
word. With the foundation of freedom, the constitution of a new political
entity, it is altogether different. In this respect, we should be able to set an
example to the whole world, and more particularly to those new ethnic groups
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and peoples who in rapid succession are rising to nationhood. I am afraid we
have been found wanting even in this, and the reason for our failing lies, of
course, in that we deal here with colored people and that we have been unable
to solve the race question in our own country. The present non-violent fight of
our Negro fellow-citizens for political and civil equality could teach us some
elementary lessons about this aspect of revolution and thus become one of our
greatest assets in the future instead of remaining the greatest liability of our
foreign policy.
However that may be, let us not forget that every revolution must go
through two stages, the stage of liberation — from poverty or from foreign
domination
and the stage of foundation of freedom. In terms of a political
process, these two belong together, and yet as political phenomena they are
entirely different and must be kept distinct. What we must try to understand
is not simply the theoretical truism that liberation is the prerequisite for
freedom, but the practical truth that liberation from necessity, because of its
urgency, always takes precedence over the building of freedom. Even more
important is to keep in mind that poverty cannot be defeated by political means,
that the whole record of past revolutions — if we only knew how to read it —
demonstrates beyond doubt that every attempt to solve the social question with
political means leads into terror, and that it is terror which sends revolutions to
their doom. If we were still living under conditions where scarcity and
abundance were entirely natural phenomena, there would indeed be no hope
that revolution could ever succeed in the world at large. The great original
American experience of foundation on which the republic of the United States
rests would remain what it has been for so long, an exception from an iron
rule and an incident of hardly more than local significance. But this is no
onger t e case. Even though the difficulties standing in the way of a solution
to the predicament of mass poverty are still enormous, there exists today the
very legitimate hope that the advancement of the natural sciences and their
no ogy will open, in a not too distant future, possibilities of dealing with
these economic matters on technical and scientific grounds, outside all political
consi erations. To be sure, the solution of the social question that technology,
and nothing else, holds in store by no means guarantees the eventual establish
ment of freedom, it would only remove the most obvious obstacle; but even the
mere prospect of this solution should once and for all preclude the terrible and
terribly dangerous usage of "the diamond point" of necessity for the purpose
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In conclusion, let me point to the last two major revolutions - the
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Hungarian Revolution, which so quickly and so brutally was crushed by foreign
domination, and the Cuban Revolution, which has not yet come to its end. The
Hungarian Revolution was the only revolution I know of since the American
Revolution in which the question of bread, of poverty, of the order of society,
played no role whatsoever, which was entirely political in the sense that the
people fought for nothing but freedom — freedom of thought and action, of
speech and assembly — and that their chief concern was the form their new
government was to assume. Whereby it is important to remember that none of
the participants — and they constituted for all practical purposes the entire
population -—• ever thought of undoing the profound social change which the
Communist regime had effected in the country. It was precisely the social con
ditions they took for granted — just as, under vastly different circumstances,
the men of the American Revolution took for granted the social and economic
conditions of their people. The Cuban Revolution, unfortunately, offers the
opposite example for very obvious reasons; up to now, it has run true to the
course of the French Revolution. And while our attitude during the Hungarian
crisis, right or wrong, was not based on a failure to understand what was in
volved in that revolution, I think the same cannot be said with respect to the
Cuban Revolution, which only geographically is so much closer to the American
sphere of interest and comprehension. While our failure in the case of the
Hungarian Revolution can be traced to power politics, our failure in the case
of the Cuban Revolution includes a failure to understand what it means when
a poverty-stricken people in a backward country, with corruption having been
rampant for a very long time, is suddenly released from the obscurity of their
farms and houses, when they are brought out into the street of a capital they
never had even seen before, and are told: All this is yours, these are your
streets, and your buildings, and your possessions, and hence your pride! Since
these people passionately aspire to walk in dignity, without yet knowing what it
might mean to act in freedom, it will take them a considerably longer time
than it may take us or our so-called experts — those, that is, who know every
thing and can imagine nothing — to realize that they may be deceived and
pushed onto the road which leads to the hell of a totalitarian dictatorship.
We have the great privilege of living under conditions that permit us to
walk in dignity and to act in freedom. It would be good for us to remember
from time to time that such conditions are the conditions of an island in a
very troubled sea. In the long run, it may be even more important to remember
that the foundations for our freedom were laid in a revolution made by men
who valued their public happiness and their public freedom at least as much if
not more than they valued their private well-being and their civil rights.
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